Fordham Law Review Online
Volume 86

Article 16

2017

Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, and the
Fortieth Anniversary of Government by Judiciary
Eric J. Segall
Georgia State University College of Law, eoe@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Segall, Eric J. (2017) "Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, and the Fortieth Anniversary of Government by Judiciary," Fordham Law
Review Online: Vol. 86 , Article 16.
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro/vol86/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Law Review Online by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, NEW ORIGINALISM,
AND THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
Eric J. Segall*
“We will almost surely never again see a [Lochner era] in which the Court
takes from liberals, as it now does from conservatives, what they win in
the political process by, for example, striking down economic
regulation . . . .”1

Last year marked the fortieth anniversary of Professor Raoul Berger’s
book Government by Judiciary, which became an originalism manifesto.2
Berger, the son of Russian immigrants and a New Deal Democrat, criticized
many Warren and Burger Courts’ liberal, and in his view illegitimate,
judicial decisions. He argued that the Justices employed the same activist
methodology used by the U.S. Supreme Court during the so-called Lochner
era,3 when the Justices overruled progressive economic legislation. His
book passionately called for judges to employ judicial restraint by focusing
on text and original meaning, not evolving values, as the cornerstone of
constitutional interpretation. According to Jonathan O’Neil, the author of a
leading book about originalism, “[m]ore than any other single scholar
Berger highlighted the issues that separated originalism from legal
liberalism and brought them to a wide audience. Government by Judiciary
attained a level of renown and influence achieved by only a handful of
books in the history of American constitutional scholarship.”4
Now, four decades later, a new form of originalism has emerged among
some conservative and libertarian constitutional scholars led by professors
Randy Barnett and Ilya Somin, litigator Clark Neily,5 and embraced by
right-wing think tanks such as the Cato Institute and The Heritage
* Kathy & Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1019, 1022–23 (1992).
2. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1977).
3. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a labor law that set
maximum work hours for violating freedom of contract protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
4. JONATHAN O’NEIL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 131 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 757 (2013); Clark M. Neily III, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in
the States: Ambiguity, False Modesty, and (Maybe) Another Win for Originalism, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 185 (2010); Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 625, 651–52 (2012).
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Foundation. This influential school of thought, which often goes by the
name “Judicial Engagement,”6 emphasizes text and original meaning as the
essential tools of constitutional interpretation.7
However, Judicial
Engagement scholars advocate for a completely different view of judicial
review than the one Professor Berger thought necessary for originalist
constitutional interpretation. While Berger placed an enormously high
burden of proof on plaintiffs claiming laws are inconsistent with the
Constitution, Judicial Engagement scholars and litigators want to reverse
that burden, requiring the government to establish in each case that the law
at issue meets constitutional standards.8 Whereas Berger’s originalism
minimized the judicial role in resolving social and political disputes, the
Judicial Engagement school wants judges to aggressively police
constitutional boundaries.9
Whether one favors Berger’s restraint, Barnett’s and Somin’s judicial
aggression, or some moderate theory in-between depends entirely on
personal perspectives concerning the role of unelected, life-tenured judges
in our constitutional democracy. There are no right or wrong beliefs on that
issue. To the extent that Barnett, Somin, and others claim that originalism
justifies their calls for judicial engagement, however, they are using a label
that does not justify their preferred method of judicial review. Given
President Trump’s promise to only appoint originalist judges,10 and the
important role the term “originalism” now plays throughout our current
politics, this transformation—or, perhaps, misuse—of the term originalism
is a serious matter.
Part I briefly summarizes Berger’s originalist approach. Part II describes
how the new Judicial Engagement originalists suggest judges should
resolve constitutional cases. Part III explains why text and history do not
support their judicially enforceable, libertarian political agendas. Part III
does not suggest that this agenda leads to bad results, is harmful, or should
not be adopted by today’s judges. But for the sake of governmental and
academic transparency, judges, legal scholars, and politicians who embrace
Judicial Engagement, should also accept that their theory of judicial review
is not supported by either the Constitution’s text or history. Judicial
Engagement can only be justified by adopting a “living Constitution”
approach to constitutional interpretation.
6. See Center for Judicial Engagement, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/center-for-judicialengagement/ [https://perma.cc/RVW4-HEHS] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
7. See Supreme Court at a Crossroads: Judicial Engagement vs. Judicial Restraint:
What Should Conservatives Prefer?, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/event/supreme-courtcrossroads-judicial-engagement-vs-judicial-restraint-conservatives-prefer/ [https://perma.cc/
F6VX-QPGQ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
8. See, e.g., Terms of Engagement: More Constitution, Less Government, INST. FOR
JUST., http://ij.org/center-for-judicial-engagement/cje-research/terms-of-engagement-moreconstitution-less-government/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9X-J28Y] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
9. See id.
10. Ariane de Vogue, Trump’s Originalist, Neil Gorsuch, Finds His Place, CNN (Apr.
7, 2018, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/07/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-courtone-year-anniversary/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z6NQ-TBCW] (“‘We are appointing
judges who will interpret the Constitution as written,’ the President said.”).
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I. BERGER AND ORIGINALISM
Berger’s originalist views formed at a young age. In 1942, after he
witnessed the end of the judicial aggression of the Lochner era, 11 Berger
criticized the recently decided Bridges v. California,12 which held that the
First Amendment prohibits state courts from issuing contempt citations for
out-of-court statements pertaining to a pending case absent a “clear and
present danger.”13 Berger believed that the First Amendment’s history
demonstrated that the Constitution did not reach such cases. For example,
he felt that the evidence supporting that proposition was so clear that he
compared Bridges to what he called the inappropriate judicial review of the
Lochner Court.14 He asked rhetorically whether
liberals, after steadily criticizing the tendency of the [Lochner era] court
to read laissez-faire into the Constitution, [can] afford to sanctify by their
own example an interpretive approach which for a generation was
employed to block social legislation and may once again be turned against
themselves?
That approach, it is trite to remark, purported to give effect to
inexorable constitutional mandates, while in fact the prejudices of the
justices had become the Procrustean test of overdue social adjustment.15

Thirty years later, Berger played an important role during the Watergate
scandal arguing that there was no historical evidence supporting a
presidential executive privilege to withhold papers and tapes relevant to
either a criminal or congressional investigation.16 In making these
arguments and others, Berger never wavered from his strong views that
judicial restraint and original intent or meaning were the twin pillars of
legitimate constitutional interpretation. He believed that James Bradley
Thayer’s rule of “clear mistake”—that judges should only overturn laws
when their constitutionality was not open to “rational question”—was the
proper stance for the judiciary. 17 It is therefore not surprising that, when
faced with the aggressive and anti-historical judicial review practiced by the
Warren Court, Berger argued strenuously against the Court’s decisions.
In 1977, Berger wrote Government by Judiciary.18 The book’s essential
thesis, and one that would be repeated by many originalist scholars, such as
11. See Ian Millhiser, The Radical Ideology of this Trump Nominee Makes Even the
Most Conservative SCOTUS Justices Uneasy, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://thinkprogress.org/trumps-most-radical-nominee-since-neil-gorsuch-02d1bcabc8e0/
[https://perma.cc/EH4M-VKSS].
12. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
13. Id. at 295–97.
14. Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 604
(1942).
15. Id. at 604–05.
16. Raoul Berger, Originalism and the Bill of Rights, Part Three - Nixon, with Berger
and Fries, GLIBERTARIANS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://glibertarians.com/2017/04/raoul-bergeroriginalism-and-the-bill-of-rights-part-three-nixon-with-berger-and-fries/ [https://perma.cc/
VXL9-NFD8].
17. O’NEIL, supra note 4, at 114.
18. See generally BERGER, supra note 2.
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Judge Robert Bork and Lino Graglia,19 was that only a theory of
interpretation based on the “original intention[s]” of the founders could
negate the “judicial power to revise the Constitution.”20
Although much of Berger’s book tried to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment ignored and/or
distorted the original meaning of that Amendment, he also discussed the
broader question of how the Justices should engage in constitutional
interpretation.21 He argued that the Justices who transformed vague
constitutional text into open-ended repositories of rights “usurped the
[sovereign] power” of elected institutions to make laws adapting to social
change.22 He suggested that the founding fathers, although expecting
judicial review, never intended the Court to go beyond the clear commands
of the Constitution’s text and history.23
Thirty-five years after his first law review article on the topic, Berger had
still not given up trying to convince liberals that, if judges departed from
text and history whenever they deemed it important enough, judicial review
will inevitably reflect the subjective value choices of the judiciary, which at
times may well be quite conservative. One reviewer of his book summed
up this argument as follows: “If judges are not limited by some historically
ascertainable legislative intent, they will have nothing to guide them but
their own preferences. This result is inconsistent with democratic values
and frequently leads, as during the Lochner era, to substantively undesirable
decisions.”24
II. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT AND ORIGINALISM
Professor Barnett self-identifies as an originalist. He has written “I call
myself an originalist (of the original public meaning variety). Period.”25
He has written numerous books and articles arguing that the text and history
of the Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, justify not only judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights (in the sense that such rights are not specifically spelled out by other
constitutional text), but also a presumption of liberty that requires the
federal government to bear the burden of proof whenever someone claims

19. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Lino Graglia,
Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide The Answer?, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011).
20. BERGER, supra note 2, at 403.
21. See generally id.
22. Gerald Lynch, Book Review, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1978) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1977)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1096.
25. Randy Barnett, Off to a Bad Start: Originalism and the Good Constitution, WASH.
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/23/off-to-a-bad-start-originalism-and-the-good-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/8ZCH-HTVH].
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their freedom is abridged by a federal law.26 Rather than summarize
Barnett’s views myself, here is an accurate description of his philosophy by
a sympathetic New Originalist:
Barnett seeks to impose strict limits on democratic majorities in order to
protect individuals as sovereigns.
[This] theory of individual sovereignty implies strong judicial
protection for a wide range of individual freedoms, both economic and
non-economic . . . . While modern judicial orthodoxy emphasizes the
need to protect “personal” liberties such as freedom of speech and
privacy, Barnett emphasizes that economic freedom is often just as
important to individual liberty and just as threatened by unconstrained
majoritarianism . . . . Barnett is right to argue that “judicial restraint,”
often defined as deference to democratic legislatures, was a major element
in the conservative critique of the “judicial activist” left. But, from early
on, many conservatives also argued for strong judicial enforcement of the
original meaning of the Constitution, even in cases where doing so meant
invalidating a variety of democratically enacted laws . . . .
The theory of individual sovereignty advanced by Barnett offers an
alternative potential justification for originalism: given the many libertyenhancing aspects of the original Constitution, as amended after the Civil
War, adhering to the original meaning offers a greater likelihood of
effectively protecting individual sovereignty than any other realistically
available option.27

How should judges enforce this strong form of judicial review? Barnett
has joined other New Originalists such as Professors Keith Whittington,
Jack Balkin, and Lawrence Solum, to advocate a judicial method centered
around the distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional construction.28 The process of interpretation involves
ascertaining what was the semantic (non-legal) original public meaning of
the Constitution at the time of enactment.29 This meaning does not change,
but it may not resolve future legal claims surrounding its application.
Constitutional construction is the process whereby legal actors, usually
judges, apply that semantic meaning to new problems.30 In Barnett’s
words,
originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that identifies the
meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment.
The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything
26. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Continuing Relevance of the
Original Meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017); Randy
E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV 1 (2006).
27. Ilya Somin, Book Review, 17 FED. SOC. REV. 64, 64–67 (2016) (emphasis added)
(reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY
AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (1st ed. 2016)).
28. See generally Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New
Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013); Lawrence
B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013).
29. See generally Richard Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 703 (2009).
30. Id. at 707–08.
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one needs to know to resolve all possible cases and controversies.
Originalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out.
This is not a bug; it is a feature. Were a constitution too specific, its
original meaning probably would become outdated . . . .31

New Originalists are candid that, at the point of construction, judges must
employ normative judgments to resolve constitutional cases.32 Such
judgments cannot be inconsistent with original meaning, but they will also
not be deducible from that original meaning.33 For Barnett, and other
scholars who believe in Judicial Engagement, constitutional construction
should emphasize a “‘presumption of liberty’ that places the burden on the
government to justify its restrictions on liberty as necessary and proper.”34
This presumption applies to all cases regardless of whether the right at issue
is or is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, or whether the
judges deem the right to be economic or non-economic in nature.35
The placement of the burden of proof on the government in all cases
implicating liberty and freedom is far removed from the originalism of
Berger, as well as Judge Bork and other originalists writing in the 1970s
and 1980s, who believed the Warren and early Burger Courts exercised
illegitimate judicial review. Yet both schools of thought claim their
approaches are justified by the text and original meaning of the
Constitution. Strictly as a matter of interpretation of text and history, they
cannot both be right.
III. THE ABSENCE OF TEXT AND HISTORY
IN JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
Not all New Originalists agree that constitutional construction should
embrace a strong presumption of liberty that applies to both enumerated and
non-enumerated rights.
It is possible to adopt the interpretationconstruction framework and argue for strong judicial deference to state and
federal laws.36 For those like Barnett, Somin, and other scholars who
advocate for Judicial Engagement,37 however, there are major obstacles to
their argument that judges should exercise strong judicial review.
First, there is not a single word in the Constitution authorizing judges to
invalidate state or federal laws, much less suggesting that the founding
fathers expected to place upon government the burden of proving in court
the validity of any statute that infringes liberty. Moreover, at the time of
the founding, no country in history had ever expressly or even implicitly
31. Randy Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65,
69–70 (2011).
32. James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
433, 436 (2013).
33. Barnett, supra note 31, at 70.
34. Id.
35. See generally id.
36. See ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 152 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 5, at 665–67.
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granted judges that authority. This lack of textual support suggests that
strong judicial review was not contemplated by the founding fathers.38
Despite this absence of textual support, however, there is substantial
consensus among historians and legal scholars, including myself, that the
men who wrote and ratified the Constitution expected judges to possess the
power to invalidate laws inconsistent with the Constitution.39 For example,
Alexander Hamilton wrote the most important pre-Constitution defense of
judicial review in The Federalist Papers, which were a group of essays
written by Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to persuade the people
of New York to adopt the new Constitution.40 In Federalist No. 78,
Hamilton explained why judicial review was a necessary component of the
new constitutional structure and why the power to veto laws did not make
the judicial branch too powerful.41
Hamilton justified judicial review by observing that the Constitution had
become the supreme law of the new country. It logically followed that
no legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To
deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal;
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people
are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of
powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what
they forbid.42

After arguing that legislators cannot be the judges of their own powers,
Hamilton wrote the following important paragraph about courts and their
responsibility to enforce the Constitution:
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and
must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in
other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.43

This quotation sets forth the essential rationale for allowing judges to set
aside laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution. Hamilton assumes
that the Constitution is supreme law, that the job of judges is to interpret
38. See Irving R. Kaufman, What Did the Founding Fathers Intend?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Feb. 23, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/23/magazine/what-did-the-foundingfathers-intend.html [https://perma.cc/G3FK-TL6B].
39. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
40. See The Federalist Papers, LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/
ourdocs/federalist.html [https://perma.cc/JU8K-2RQQ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
41. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 43 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
43. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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that law and that, if there is an “irreconcilable variance” between a law and
the Constitution, judges must enforce the Constitution instead of the law.44
Hamilton also said that judges must not enforce laws that are inconsistent
with the “manifest tenor” of the Constitution.45 The concepts of
“irreconcilable variance” and “manifest tenor” are much more consistent
with the idea of strong judicial deference than the New Originalists’ idea of
strong judicial review where the government has the burden of proof
whenever someone alleges an infringement of liberty.
There were also a few early state and federal cases where judges
considered striking down laws as inconsistent with either a state
constitution or the U.S. Constitution prior to the 1803 landmark decision in
Marbury v. Madison,46 where the Court first explicitly adopted and
defended the doctrine of judicial review. Many scholars—including Larry
Kramer, Sylvia Snowiss, Gordon Wood, James Bradley Thayer, and Dean
Michael Treanor—have reviewed these early cases.47 Although there are
some disagreements among these academics over what these early cases say
about the appropriate level of deference to be given to state and federal
laws, there is a strong consensus that—outside of laws relating directly to
judicial power or jury questions—the people of the founding era believed in
either extremely strong judicial deference or moderate deference to other
political decision-makers.48 There is no evidence that the founding fathers
thought judges would exercise aggressive judicial review by placing the
burden of proof of establishing the validity of all laws which infringe what
Barnett calls the “Presumption of Liberty” on the government.49
Larry Kramer, the former Dean of Stanford Law School, canvassed the
relevant cases and concluded that judicial review was infrequently
exercised and only exercised where the law clearly violated the
Constitution.50 Professor Snowiss reviewed the same cases and other
materials and argued that judges at the time thought judicial review would
be limited to “concededly unconstitutional act[s].”51 Wood, a leading
historian of the founding era, found that judicial review was “invoked only
on the rare occasions of flagrant and unequivocal violations of the
Constitution.”52 In addition, Thayer, the scholar most associated with the
view that the Supreme Court should be highly deferential to acts of
Congress, justified his conclusions with significant historical evidence from
the founding period.53 Even Dean Treanor, who takes a slightly different
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 5 (2004).
50. See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004).
51. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 60 (1990).
52. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall
Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 798–99 (1999).
53. See generally James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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view on this subject than other scholars, concluded that people who thought
about judicial review in the founding era believed in “general deference to a
coequal legislature’s substantive constitutional decision making [even
though the courts also exercised] close scrutiny of that body’s decision
making where it affected the judiciary.”54
Neither the text of the Constitution nor its history suggest that judges
should play a strong or aggressive role in striking down state or federal laws
that do not implicate the power of the courts. Instead, the popular
conception was that only legislative acts that clearly transcended
constitutional limits would be null and void.55 Yet the Center for Judicial
Engagement says the following about its vision:
Government actions are not entitled to “deference” simply because they
result from a political process involving elected representatives. To the
contrary, the Framers were acutely aware of and deeply concerned about
the dangers of interest group politics and overweening government, and
the structure of the Constitution rejects reflexive deference to the other
branches. It is the courts’ job to check forbidden political impulses, not
ratify them under the banner of majoritarian democracy.56

As part of its statement of principles, the Center for Judicial Engagement
also says the following:
Just as the words in the Constitution do not change over time, neither does
their meaning. Though some parts of the Constitution may speak more
precisely than others, for the Constitution to mean anything at all, judges
must strive to understand the entire document and apply its restrictions
and values to all situations, including new ones. Judges’ interpretations
and applications of the Constitution must not be influenced by their
personal preferences—including preferences for majoritarianism or
judicial minimalism.57

These calls for strong judicial review of economic and non-economic
legislation are simply not supported by text or history. To the contrary,
evidence from the early period indicates that the framers thought judges
would apply either moderate or strong deference when reviewing state and
federal laws.58 Rather than relying on judicial exercise of strong judicial
review, the founding fathers believed that the main check on governmental
tyranny would be the structural requirements in the Tenth Amendment
limiting Congress’ powers to those enumerated in the Constitution and the

54. Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 561
(2005) (emphasis added).
55. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
56. Declaration of the Center for Judicial Engagement, CTR. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT,
http://ij.org/center-for-judicial-engagement/programs/declaration-of-the-center-for-judicialengagement/ [https://perma.cc/3FG3-QUDZ] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
57. Principles of Judicial Engagement, CTR. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT, http://ij.org/centerfor-judicial-engagement/programs/principles-of-judicial-engagement/
[https://perma.cc/
583D-N58E] (last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
58. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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numerous provisions in the Constitution setting forth the separation of
powers between and among the three branches of the federal government.59
Professor Berger believed the main purpose of the Constitution was to
prevent tyranny and maximize individual freedom.60 But Professor Berger
was also adamant that judges could play, at most, a limited role in
protecting against that tyranny.61 In his words, the Constitution was:
a text that was designed to limit and hobble the exercise of power by the
delegates of the people. That is the starting point from which we have to
proceed and to evaluate what the delegates were seeking. . . . [A]
remarkable North Carolinian, Thomas Burke, emphasized that it was
necessary to guard against the greediness of power. On top of that, the
founders had a profound distrust of judicial discretion. Even a Tory
judge, Thomas Hutchison of Massachusetts, said, “. . . the Judge should
never be the Legislator . . . this tends to a State of Slavery.” It was for
this reason that Chancellor Kent referred to the judges’ “dangerous
discretion . . . and [the dangers when judges] roam at large in the trackless
field of their own imaginations.”62

Judge Bork expressed similar views when defending his originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation. Judge Bork objected to judges
closely reviewing economic legislation, because “when employed as a
formula for the general review of all restrictions on human freedom without
guidance from the historical Constitution, the court is cut loose from any
external moorings and required to perform tasks that are not only beyond its
competence, but beyond any conceivable judicial function.”63
Professor Richard Epstein advocates for strong judicial review of
economic legislation that is even stronger than what was exercised by the
Court in Lochner.64 In response, Justice Scalia was aghast and responded
that “‘our system already suffers from relatively recent constitutionalizing,
and thus judicializing, of social judgments that ought better be left to the
democratic process.’ He warned that a ‘reversal of a half-century of
judicial restraint in the economic realm’ represented a ‘threat to
constitutional democracy.’”65
When it comes to maximizing social goods, the reluctance of old school
originalists to approve strong judicial review of economic legislation may—
59. The Constitution in One Sentence: Understanding the Tenth Amendment, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-constitutionone-sentence-understanding-the-tenth-amendment [https://perma.cc/YS2N-F785].
60. See generally BERGER, supra note 2.
61. See generally id.
62. Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 350, 350 (1988).
63. Thomas Colby & Peter Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527,
565. (2015) (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic
Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 829–830 (1986)).
64. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of
Error, 4 CATO J. 711 (1985).
65. Colby & Smith, supra note 63, at 566 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as
Human Affairs, in SCALIA V. EPSTEIN: TWO VIEWS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 4 (Cato Inst.
1985)).
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or may not—be the best posture for today’s judges. If the scholars and
pundits who favor Judicial Engagement want to make that argument, we
should listen. But just like many of the liberal decisions of the Warren and
early Burger Courts, as well as the same-sex marriage decisions of today,
such strong judicial review is not supported by the Constitution’s original
meaning.
The difference between the aggressive liberal decisions, often criticized
by conservatives, and the calls for Judicial Engagement by today’s
conservative scholars is that the authors of the liberal decisions did not
pretend that text and originalism supported their results. Some cases, like
Lawrence v. Texas,66 explicitly adopted an anti-originalist, living
Constitution approach to constitutional interpretation.67 Justice Kennedy
said that “times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”68
Other cases simply ignored text and history by incorporating bare recitals
of the text in question. Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,69 finding a constitutional right to privacy that would later be
used by the Court in Roe v. Wade,70 is only six pages long. Even though
Justice Douglas relied on six different constitutional amendments—each
without any mention of the word “privacy”—to support his holding, he
does not mention the original meaning of the constitutional text in the entire
opinion.71 Furthermore, the Court’s opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,72
which articulated the fundamental test for determining whether
inflammatory speech (such as virulent racist epithets) is constitutionally
protected, is five pages long and does not address the historical meaning of
the First Amendment.73
These cases can be persuasively criticized on many different grounds, but
they cannot be criticized for a lack of transparency or honesty. At their
core, these cases were judicial fiats announcing fundamental values. The
same would be true if the Court ever adopts the Judicial Engagement model
advocated by Barnett, Somin, and the various think tanks pushing for
Judicial Engagement.74 Such a system of judicial review might be right,
66. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67. Id. at 579.
68. Id.
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. See generally id.
72. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
73. See generally id.
74. See generally Randy Barnett, “Judicial Engagement” Is Not the Same As “Judicial
Activism,” WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/01/28/judicial-engagement-is-not-the-same-as-judicial-activism/
?utm_term=.402a5291f2a0
[https://perma.cc/T5AD-UW7D]; Ilya Somin, Defending
Judicial Supremacy, WASH. POST (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/defending-judicial-supremacy/?utm_term=.62402e2
2857c [https://perma.cc/M9D3-GBYC].
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wrong, desirable, or harmful but one thing is clear: it would not be based
on either the text or history of the original Constitution. Instead, the theory
of Judicial Engagement is a classic example, for better or for worse, of a
living constitutionalism approach to constitutional interpretation. Those
who advocate for such a system should at least embrace, not reject, living
constitutionalism.

